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Abstract  standing  EE  loans  were  delinquent,  repre-
The  Economic  Emergency  (EE)  loan  pro-  senting  21  percent  of  total  EE  fund
gram, administered by the FmHA, was created  outstanding  (USDA,ERS  (a)). The  focus  of this  research  is  on the  allo- by  Congress  in  1978.  The  primary  purpose by  Contgress  in  1978.  he  prpvimary  purpose  cation of EE loan funds at the state level and of the program was to provide credit to farm-
ers  who  were  unable  to  obtain  credit  from  on  the  expansionary  effect  of  the  program
on the farm credit market.  The initial stimuli normal lenders due to economic  stress.  Over  the farm credit market. The initial stimuli for  the  research  were  findings  of  the  U.S. six billion dollars of EE loans were extended  for  the  research  ee f  s  of te 
nationally  during  fiscal  years  1978  through  GneralAccountng Officethasuggestedthat
allocation  of  EE  funds  may  have  conflicted 1981.  This paper examines  the allocation of
with  the  intent  of  the  enabling  legislation EE  loans  at  the  state  level  and  the  expan-  and  that  EE funds  may have  displaced credit
sionary effect  of the program  on farm  credit  that  uld have  been forhcming frm nr
markets.  Empirical evidence  is provided that  mal sources  (United  States  GAO  (b))  Given
EE funds were allocated to states consistently  e  crease  seerity  of the  farm  financial
with  the  general  criteria  cited  in the  devel-  itatin tday and  d  es  the  ar aa
opment  of the  EE  program  and  that  the  EE  iu  differ  s  in  he
program expanded farm credit markets rather  nde  and strctre  programs  currently
than  displacing  loans from  other  sources.  these  are  not  primary concerns of the  1985  emergency  credit  de-
Key words: Economic Emergency loans, farm  bate. Analysis of the 1978 program may, how-
credit,  Farmers  Home  Adminis-  ever, provide  insights  into the effect  of that
tration.  program  on  the  current  farm  financial  situ-
-'A~~~~~~~~  ~ation. Arguments  for  emergency  farm  credit
programs  in  1985  are  similar to those  made
prior to  passage  of the  Emergency  Agricul-  EMERGENCY  AGRICULTURAL  CREDIT
tural Credit Adjustment Act  of 1978. Farmers  ADJUSTMENT  ACT  OF  1978
are  in  financial  distress,  many  face  bank-
ruptcy, and  "sufficient"  credit  from  normal  Effective  Augustrat  ,  1978,  the  Farmers
lenders  is  apparently  not  forthcoming.  Par-  ome  instaton  as  uthored
adoxically, the  1985 situation appears  more  to  in  ing lns  to farmers  under the
severe  than that in  1978,  due to the contin-  provisions  of Public  Law  95-334,  the Emer-
ued  deterioration  of the  financial  status  of  n  Agricultural  Credit Adjustment  Act of
farmers.  However,  the  prospects  for  emer-  1978.  FmHA  was  authorized  to  guarantee
gency  aid  are  not  good  due  to  the  large  loans made by private lenders and to provide
federal  budget  deficits  and  the  free  market  insured  EE  loans  directly  to  farmers  from federal  budget  deficits  and  the  free  market  revolving  funds  maintained  by  the  FmHA.
orientation of the Reagan administration with  ustifiin  fr  the  EE  loan proram and  the
respect  to  agricultural  policy  Justification  for the  EE  loan program  and the
respect  to agricultural  policy.  intent  of  the  legislation  were  stated  in  the Approximately six billion dollars  in FmHA  Feea  legislation were  stated  in  the
emergency  loans  were  extended  to  farmers  of August  1
under  the  EE  program  from  1978  to  1981.  The needfor this new economic emer-
As  of June  30,  1984,  46.7  percent  of out-  gency  loan program results from  the
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21current acute financial condition  of  A  second  perspective  for  the  analysis  of
many farmers and ranchers who have  the  1978  program  relates to the longrun  ef-
suffered severe economic losses due to  fects  of  the  program.  Given  the  relatively
low prices and escalating production  short  time  period  since  the  program  expi-
costs (p. 35,661).  ration and the existence  of other factors that
The intended effect  is to provide In-  have  impacted  current  financial  conditions,
sured Economic  Emergency loans  to  a  direct empirical  test of longrun  effects  of
farmers and ranchers who are unable  the  program  is  not  feasible  at the  present.
to obtain credit from their normal ag-  Results  of  the  analysis  of  the  operation  of
ricultural  lender(s) due to national  or  the  1978 program have implications for cur-
areawide economic stresses such as a  rent financial  conditions,  however.  It can be
general  tightening of agricultural  credit  argued  that  greater  shortrun  success  in  ad-
or  an unfavorable  relationship  between  ministering the program,  providing funds to
production  costs andprices  receivedfor  farmers  under  greater stress,  and expanding
agricultural  commodities (p.  35,648).  the credit market is associated with increased
longrun prospects  for future  farm  failures.
The  EE  loan  program  had an  original  ex-  The  major  effect  of  an  EE  program  is  to
piration  date  of  May  15,  1980,  but  it  was  improve the liquidity of borrowers to ensure
subsequently  extended  until  September  30,  shortrun survival  of farms having  difficulties
1981.  EE  loan commitments  nationally were  meeting  current  financial  obligations  and
.1 billion,  3.1  billion,  2.2  billion,  and  1.2  continuingto operate. If the 1978 emergency
billion  dollars  in  fiscal  years  1978,  1979,  credit  program was  non-expansionary,  if EE
1980, and 1981, respectively, and comprised  funds were used to restructure  existing debt
approximately.6 percent,  15.4 percent,  14.1  or  to  displace  new  higher  cost  debt  from
percent, and 6.3 percent of the total change  normal lenders, the increased liquidity would
in agricultural  debt  in the  United  States  in  have  been  obtained  without  reducing  the
these  years  (Ingram).  solvency of EE borrowers.  If the program was
One  perspective  for analysis  of the  1978  expansionary and total debt levels increased
program  is  related  to  the  operation  of  the  more  than  they  would  have  in  the  absence
program - was  it administered  consistently  of the program,  debt-equity  ratios  and  debt
with the intent of the legislation?  Questions  servicing requirements would have increased
about the administration of the program arise  because  of the  program,  worsening  longrun
from the absence of explicit allocation guide-  survival  prospects.  In making  the liquidity/
lines for the distribution  of funds,  and from  solvency  trade-off  with  an  emergency  loan
the ambiguity  of general  guidelines  such  as  program,  it  is naturally  hoped that  farm in-
making  funds  available  under  conditions  of  come and equity levels will increase to avoid
"tight" credit or in the case of unavailability  the  negative  effects  of  the  decline  in  sol-
of  funds  at  "reasonable"  rates  from  normal  vency.  Unfortunately,  the  1978  EE  program
lenders.  A General Accounting  Office  (GAO)  has been followed by declines  in income and
investigation  of  a  sample  of  individual  EE  equity values  in agriculture,  making  the de-
loans from selected states (United States GAO  dine in solvency  associated  with  an expan-
sionary  emergency  credit  program  relevant
(b))  found  some  evidence  of  EE  loans  that  sionary  emergency  credit  program  relevant
were extended  in apparent  conflict with the  to farm survival  today
intent of the legislation.  These included loans
used to refinance  recent  land purchases  and  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK  FOR
loans  which  would  have  apparently  been  ANALYSIS  OF  CREDIT  MARKET
available from normal lenders. The ambiguity  EXPANSION
of  the  loan  criteria  and  the  GAO  findings  A  simplified representation  of the inter-
raise the possibility that the  EE program may  relationships  between  the demand for loans
have displaced loans which would have been  and  the  supply  of  loans  from  conventional
forthcoming from normal lenders rather than  sources  and  from  the  EE  loan  program  is
expanding the credit market. A major purpose  presented  in  Figure  1.  In  Figure  1,  Ns  rep-
of this research is to empirically examine the  resents  the supply curve for funds from  nor-
allocation  of EE funds  and the expansionary  mal  lenders,  EEm,,  represents  the  supply  of
effect  of the  EE  program  so  as  to  test  the  EE funds allocated to a state, and D represents
consistency  of the operation  of the program  the  total amount  of new debt demanded  in
with the  legislative  intent.  a year  at various  interest rates.  Based on the
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Figure 1. Effects  of  Economic  Emergency  Loans on  Farm Credit Markets.
development  of  the  EE  loan  program,  the  of EE  funds made  available,  given  identical
supply  of  EE  funds,  EEma,  is  affected  by de-  supply  and  demand  situations  otherwise,
mand  for  farm  loans,  the  supply  of  funds  could  be  due  either  to  differences  in  the
from  normal  lenders,  and  on  the  congres-  national allocation  of EE  funds from year  to
sional allocation of funds for the EE program.  year or  to  differences  in the  application  of
The  supply  of  EE  funds  is  invariant  to  the  the general  EE  loan guidelines  by FmHA  ad-
interest rate  on  EE  loans,  i,  and the interest  ministrators in response to the perceived sup-
rate  on  EE  loans  is  assumed  to be  less  than  ply and demand  situation.
the  rate  charged  by normal  lenders. The  in-  The  discontinuous  curves,  iecs in Figure  1,
terest  rate  charged  for  EE  loans  nationally  represent the combined supply curve for new
was  based  on  the  cost  of  government  bor-  debt from conventional  and  EE  sources.  The
rowing  (United  States  GAO  (a)).  construction of the combined  supply curves
Figures  l.a and  1.b represent the situation  assumes  that all  EE  funds  made  available  to
a state will be used  due to the lower cost  of where tightness of credit exists in that normal  a state  l be used due o  lower cost  of
these  funds  and  that  the  supply  curve  for lenders are effectively rationing credit. Credit  s  unds  and  a  e  sul  u funds  from  normal  lenders remains  substan- rationing is defined here to include limits on  tially unchanged  in  the  presence  of  the  EE tially unchanged  in the  presence  of  the  EE individual  loans  that  are  extended  and  the  program,  due  the sma  magnitude  of  EE program,  due to  the small magnitude  of EE denial  of loans  to potential  borrowers  with  funds  relative  to  the total  credit market.
the greatest repayment  risk who are "crowded  In  Figure  .a,  the  combined  supply curve
out"  of the  market  (Melichar).  Excess  de-  and  the  demand  curve  for  borrowed  funds
mand exists in the market at all normal lender  indicate a  total quantity of new debt for the
interest  rates.  Figures  l.a  and  1.b  differ  in  state  equal  to  QT. The  amount  EEma  is  sup-
that the  EE funds  made available  to the state  plied from  EE funds and Q, is supplied from
in  l.b are  approximately  twice  those  made  normal lenders.  In Figure  1.a,  EEm,,  is equal
available  in  l.a.  Differences  in  the  amount  to  QnQT.  Qn would also  have been  supplied
23by normal lenders under the credit rationing  Figure  1  is primarily  concerned  with  the
assumption of l.a. The EE program under this  impact  of  the supply  of funds  from normal
scenario  can  therefore  be  said  to  be  com-  lenders  and  the  EE  program  on  the  total
pletely  expansionary  in that  the  amount  of  change  in  debt that  occurs with the  imple-
funds supplied by normal lenders is the same,  mentation  of  the  EE  program.  The  expan-
with  or  without  the  EE  program,  and  each  sionary effect of EE  funding is  also impacted
dollar of EE funds increases  the total amount  by  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  borrowed
of  new  debt  extended  in  the  state  by  one  funds.  The  direct  effect  of EE  funding  is  to
dollar.  lower the cost of borrowing. A given decrease
In  Figure  1.b,  the  allocation  of  EE  funds  in the  cost  of debt will  cause  a  greater  in-
is  double  that  in  Figure  l.a  and  QT  is  the  crease in the quantity of debt demanded when
total new debt extended.  QT in  l.b is  greater  the demand for debt is more  elastic  and the
than QT  in  1.a, because  the marginal  cost of  impact  of  EE  funding  is therefore  more  ex-
funds  at  any  total  borrowing  level  is  lower  pansionary  when  the  demand  for borrowed
in the situation with the larger EE allocation.  funds  is  more  elastic.  This  can  be  observed
In  Figure  l.b, with  the  EE  program,  Qn2  is  in  Figure  1.c  by rotating  the  demand curve
provided by normal lenders at an interest rate  for funds  around the  point inlQnl.
of  in2.  Qn2  is  equal  to  QT  minus  EEma.  Qn,
would have been provided by normal lenders
in the absence of the EE program at an interest  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  EE LOAN
rate  in, . The  amount  of  EE  funds  in this  ex-  ALLOCATIONS  AND EXPANSIONARY
ample,  Qn2QT,  can  be  partitioned  into  two  EFFECTS
parts.  Q,,Q,,  reflects  the  displacement  of  simultaneous  system  of  reduced  form
funds  by normal lenders as a result of the  EE 
loan program.  QlQT  represents  the  expan  equations  was  developed  to analyze  the ex- loan  program.  Qn1QT  represents  the  expan-  pnsionary effect of emergency loans and the
sion of total debt extended as a result of the  pa  y e  t of ey  ls  ad 
factors which  were important  in  the alloca-
EE  loan program.  tion of EE  funds to the states.  The  estimated
Figures  l.c and 1.d represent the situation  syem included an emergency loan equation
where  credit  rationing  from  normal  lenders  and a total change in deb  equation. A model
is not sufficiently severe to prevent the market  of the following general  form was  estimated
from  clearing  at  the  normal  lender  interest  using cross-sectional  data for the EE program
rate.  Borrowers  can  obtain  all  of the  credit
demanded  at  interest  rate  i,,.  EE  loans  may  years:
still be extended  in this case,  however,  con-  (1)  DDET  =  f(EE  loans,  S, D),
sistent with the  stated  purposes  of the  pro-  (2)  EE  loans  =  f(Norm  loans,  S,  D,  EE
gram,  if i,,  is  considered  to  be  sufficiently  national),
high that  it does not meet the criterion  of a  d
"reasonable"  rate of interest.
Comparing  1.c  to  Figure  1.a  shows  that,  (3)  Norm  loans  =  DDET  - EE  loans.
with  identical  levels  of EE  funding,  there  is  Variables  are  reflected  as  follows:  DDET  is
more displacement of funds in the case with-  the total change in agricultural debt observed
out effective  credit  rationing.  There  was  no  in each state  and  EE  program year,  EE  loans
displacement of funds in  Figure  .a, but dis-  is the quantity of EE  loan funds  extended  in
placement  equal  to  Qn2Qni  exists  in  Figure  each state and year,  S is  a vector of variables
I.c.  affecting  the  supply  of  loans  from  normal
The  greatest  displacement  of funds  from  sources  in each  state and year,  D  is  a vector
normal  lenders  occurs  in  the  scenario  de-  of  variables  affecting  the  demand  for  agri-
picted  in  Figure  1.d.  Figure  1.d  represents  cultural  loans in each state  and year,  "Norm
the  case  where  there  are  relatively  large  loans"  is  the  amount  of  loans extended  by
amounts  of  EE  funds,  but  where  credit  ra-  normal  lenders  in  each  state  and  year,  and
tioning from  normal lenders is not effective.  EE  national  is  the  national  allocation  of  EE
The displacement of funds from normal lend-  funds  in each  year.
ers in Figure  1.d  is  greater  than  that which  Theory  does  not  provide  a  unique  speci-
occurs with smaller  amounts  of EE  funding,  fication  or  specific  functional  form  for  the
as in Figure  1.c, and greater than that which  system described  by equations  (1),  (2),  and
occurs when  credit rationing  is  in  effect,  as  (3).  This  is  due  both  to  governmental  and
in Figure  l.b.  non-profit  lending institution involvement  in
24the credit  market  and to the  lack  of knowl-  market  can be conducted  for the coefficient
edge  of the  underlying  utility functions  of  of EEjt  in equation  (1).  A coefficient not  sig-
borrowers  and  lenders.  Finance  theory  is  nificantly  different  from  zero  suggests  that
helpful, however,  in identifying variables that  the main  effect  of the  EE  loan  program was
impact the supply of and demand for credit.  the displacement of funds from other lenders.
The  demand  for  credit  is influenced  by the  A  coefficient  not significantly  different  from
expected risk and return from borrowing, the  one  suggests  that  the  EE  loan  program  was
cost of borrowing,  and internal financing  ca-  primarily  expansionary.  The  point  estimate
pacity.  The  supply  of agricultural  credit  is  of the  EE  loan  coefficient  is the  estimate  of
affected  by  the  risk  and  return  to  lenders  the  contribution  of each  EE  loan  dollar  to
from  agricultural  loans,  alternative  invest-  the  total  change  in  credit  observed  in  the
ment opportunities  for agricultural  lenders,  state.
and the cost and availability of funds to lend-
ing institutions.  Ideally,  the  analysis  would
use  micro  data  from  borrowers  and  lenders  Risk and Returns for Agricultural
at the credit market level of aggregation.  Data  Loans
in this  form were  not available  so  the state
level  of aggregation  was  employed.  Higher  levels  of risk  exposure  in lending
affect  both  the  supply  of and  demand  for
credit.  Barry  et  al.  (1981)  have  noted  that
SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  CHANGE  IN  an  important  nonprice  response  of lenders
DEBT  EQUATION  to loan risk is the imposition of credit limits
In  equation  (1),  the change  in total farm  on  agricultural  loans.  From  the  borrower's
debt observed in each state and year (DDETit)  perspective,  the  possibility  of credit  limits
is  a  function  of emergency  loans  extended  with higher loan risk implies that higher loan
to  the  state  and  supply  and  demand  char-  risk is associated with smaller credit reserves.
acteristics  of the farm  credit market  in each  Higher loan risk is therefore  associated  with
state.  Supply  and  demand  variables  are  a decrease in the demand for credit,  in order
grouped into four categories for the purpose  to  maintain  the  level  of credit  reserves  for
of  discussion:  variables  related  to  the  risk  liquidity purposes  (Barry et  al.,  1981).
and return associated with agricultural loans,  Four  commonly  cited  statistics  related  to
the cost of credit, internal financing capacity,  loan risk, return to borrowed funds, and credit
and characteristics  of the supply side of the  reserves  were  included  in  the  estimated
farm  credit  market  in  each  state.  The  coef-  change  in debt model;  the  debt-equity  ratio
ficient  of the  emergency  loan variable  is  of  of farms, the ratio of net farm income to debt,
prime  interest  in  equation  (1)  and the  dis-  the percentage  change  in farm sector equity,
cussion of equation  (1)  begins with that var-  and the  coefficient  of variation  of net farm
iable.  income.  The debt-equity  ratio,  DEt, was the
level  of total farm  debt  divided by farmers'
equity,  in state  i  at the beginning  of year  t.
Economic  Emergency  Loan  The  debt-equity  ratio  is  a  commonly  used
The main focus of the change in debt equa-  indicator  of  solvency  (Barry  et  al.,  1979;
tion is on the effect  of economic  emergency  Brigham),  and  higher values  of the ratio  in-
loan allocations  on the total change  in debt.  dicate greater risk and smaller credit reserves,
The  emergency loan variable,  EEit,  is defined  ceteris paribus. A  negative  relationship  be-
as the  total amount  of EE  loans  extended  in  tween DEi  and the change in debt is therefore
state  i  and year  t.  EEit  included  both direct  hypothesized.
emergency  loans from  the  FmHA  to farmers  The  ratio  of net cash farm income  in year
(insured loans)  and loans  from other lenders  t--1  to  total  farm  debt  at  the  beginning  of
that were guaranteed  by FmHA under the  EE  year t was included in the model as NFIDETit.
loan  program  (guaranteed  loans).  Guaran-  Penson and  Lins (p.  328) discuss the inverse
teed  loans represented  only a  minor part of  of  this  ratio  as  a  measure  of  the  relative
the  total  EE  program,  representing  approxi-  burden  of debt on  cash  income.  NFIDET  in
mately  .3,  4,  5,  and  7  percent  of  total  EE  this  model  is  an  indicator  of the  return  to
loans  nationally  in  1978  through  1981,  re-  borrowed  funds  and  the  ability  to  service
spectively  (USDA,  FmHA).  debt  from  farm  income.  Higher  values  of
Statistical  tests for the expansionary  effect  NFIDET indicate  less loan risk,  greater credit
of the  EE  loan  program  on  the  farm  credit  reserves,  and  a  larger  return  to  borrowed
25funds.  A positive  relationship  between  NFI-  of internally generated funds should also im-
DET and the change in debt is hypothesized.  ply greater liquidity and security for potential
The  percentage  change  in  farm  equity,  lenders  and should  be  positively  related  to
PCEQit- 1,  is directly  related  to the  amount  the  supply of loans.
of collateral  available  to secure  new  loans.  Two sources of internal financing  capacity
Changes  in  the  value  of equity  also  reflect  were included  in the change  in debt model,
expectations about the returns to investments  net  cash  farm  income  and  off-farm  income
in  farm  land.  Since  higher  levels  of  PCEQ  of  farm  families.  Net  cash  farm  income,
reflect greater (lesser)  relative increases  (de-  NINCi-t_  , is a measure of the absolute amount
creases) in credit reserves and better (worse)  of net  cash farm  income  in the  state,  which
expectations  about  returns,  a  positive  rela-  sets  a  theoretical  upper  limit  on  the  total
tionship  between  PCEQ  and  the  change  in  amount of farm income available in the state
debt is expected.  for  internal  financing.  The  off-farm  income
The  coefficient  of  variation  of  net  farm  variable,  OFINCit,. 1, is the total amount of off-
income,  CVINCit,  was included  in the equa-  farm  income  of farm families  in each  state.
tion as an additional  measure  of lending risk.  This variable  represents  a theoretical  upper
CVINCit  was  calculated  from  observed  net  limit on the total amount of off-farm income
farm  income  in  each  state  for  years  t--1  available  in  a  state for internal  financing.
through t-5.  Higher  values  of  CVINC  rep-  An  additional  variable  measuring  the  rel-
resent greater  variability in  net income  and  ative importance of off-farm income in a state,
higher business  risk in agriculture  in  a state.  OFIAVGi,t_-,  was  also included  in the change
The  hypothesized  relationship  between  in  debt  equation.  This  ratio  was  defined  as
CVINC  and the  change  in debt,  ceteris par-  the ratio of off-farm income  in a state  in year
ibus, is  therefore  negative.  t  divided  by a  5-year  moving  average  of net
farm income for years t-  1 through t--5. This
variable  reflects  the  normal  long  term  rela-
Costs  of  Credit and Returns to  tionship between  off-farm  income  and farm
Agricultural  Lenders  income,  by  reducing  the  effects  of year-to-
The  cost of funds  from  normal  lenders  is  year  variations  in net farm  income.
commonly  recognized  to  be  positively  re-  Based on the hypothesized  positive supply
lated to  the supply  of funds  and  negatively  response and  negative  demand  response  for
associated with the demand for funds (Penson  higher levels  of internal  financing  capacity,
and Lins; Barry et al., 1979). Since the change  the  signs  of the  coefficients  of  the  internal
in  debt  equation  in  the  estimated  system  financing  variables  in  the  change  in  debt
includes both supply  and demand variables,  equation  are  dependent  on  the  dominance
the sign of the coefficient of the interest rate  of the supply  or demand  effects.
variable  in the  change  in debt equation  de-
pends  on  whether  the  supply  or  demand
effect  is  dominant.  A  weighted  average  in-  Credit Market Supply  Characteristics
terest rate  from all normal agricultural lend-  Because of the cross-sectional  focus of the
ers would  be  preferred  for  the  model,  but  analysis,  the  size  of  the  farm  credit  market
this was  unavailable  on a cross-sectional  ba-  at the beginning  of each year,  TOTDET t, was
sis.  The  Federal  Land  Bank  interest  rate  was  included in the equation as a scale  variable.
the best available interest rate for agricultural  If all other conditions  were equal, the states
loans. This  interest rate  was specified  as  RA-  with  the  largest  farm  credit  markets  would
TE1t in the  change  in debt equation.  be  expected  to  experience  larger  absolute
changes  in  farm debt.
The  availability  of  credit  from  normal
Internal Financing Capacity  sources is difficult to model cross-sectionally.
Internal  financing  represents  a  substitute  Data on cost of funds for agricultural lending
for  borrowed  capital  and  higher  levels  of  institutions,  alternative  investment  oppor-
internal financing  capability,  ceteris paribus  tunities  for these  institutions,  and the avail-
should result in a lower cost of equity capital  ability of funds on a state-by-state  basis were
and a  decrease  in the demand  for borrowed  not  available.  Differences  in  the  supply  of
funds.  To  the  extent  that  internal  financing  agricultural  credit  from  normal  lenders  in
ability is considered by lenders,  higher levels  different states could theoretically result from
26either:  (1)  differences  in nonagricultural  in-  reasonable rates of interest",  and "economic
vestment  opportunities,  available  funds  for  stress"  were the  most  frequently cited  con-
loans, or the cost of funds for similar  lending  ditions  used  in  justification  of  the  EE  loan
institutions  in different  states  or  (2)  differ-  program.  This examination  of the allocation
ences in the relative importance of the major  of  EE  funds  therefore  focuses  on  the  rela-
lending  institutions  in  different  states.  For  tionship between factors related to these con-
example,  the  first  type  of difference  would  ditions and the amount of EE funds allocated
be  related to differences  in conditions faced  to each state.  Variables representing  agricul-
by commercial  banks in  different  states. The  tural supply and demand conditions  and the
second  type  of difference  would  be  related  national allocation of EE funds were included
to loan supply differences  between  commer-  in the  EE  loan allocation equation.  The  sup-
cial banks and Farm Credit System institutions  ply  and  demand  variables  included  in  the
and the relative importance  of the two types  change in debt equation were  also  included
of lenders  in the agricultural  credit  markets  in the  EE  allocation  equation.  The  hypoth-
in different  states.  esized  effects  of  these  variables  on  the  EE
A credit availability proxy, CREDi, _1, based  allocation  are to be  discussed.
on recent  changes  in regional  credit  availa-  The  four indicators  of risk  and credit  ca-
bility,  was  included  in  the  change  in  debt  pacity in the  change in debt equation were:
equation.  The  construction  of this  variable  the debt-equity ratio  (DEit),  the ratio  of net
is described in the data section of this paper.  farm  income  to  debt  (NFIDETit),  the  per-
A higher  value  of CREDi,t_ 1 represents  a  de-  centage change in farmers equity (PCEQi,t_-),
creasing  trend  in credit availability within  a  and  the  coefficient  of variation  of net  farm
region  and a  negative  relationship  between  income  (CVINCit).  It was  hypothesized  that
CRED  and  the  change  in  debt  is  therefore  greater risk and smaller credit reserves would
hypothesized.  be  negatively  related to  the change  in debt
Agricultural  credit  market  share  variables  and the predicted  signs of the coefficients  in
for commercial  banks,  BSHR,  and the Farm-  the  change  in debt equation  were therefore
ers  Home Administration,  FHSHRi,,  were  in-  negative  for  DE and CVINC  and positive  for
cluded in the model to represent the effects  NFIDET and PCEQ. Since the EE loan program
of the institutional structure of the farm credit  was  developed  to  provide  funds  to  farmers
market  on  the  change  in  debt.  The  market  under  financial  stress  and  those  unable  to
shares of these two institutions were  chosen  obtain  credit  from  normal  sources,  the  hy-
because  their  structures  suggest  contrasting  pothesized  signs of the coefficients  of these
behavior  in  their  responses  to  the  financial  four  variables  are  opposite  their  expected
stress  in the  farm  sector  in  the  EE  program  signs in the  change  in debt equation.
years. Commercial banks have probably been  The  EE  loan  purpose  "to  provide  funds
the most flexibility  of the major agricultural  when they are unavailable  from normal lend-
lenders in making portfolio adjustments away  ers  at  reasonable  rates"  suggests  a  positive
from agricultural loans during periods  of in-  relationship  between  normal  lender  interest
creased  financial  stress  and  risk  in  agricul-  rates  and emergency  loans.  The  EE loan rate
ture.  The  FmHA,  as the traditional  lender of  was  a  national  rate,  so  it would not be  ex-
last resort, would  conversely be expected to  pected to explain  cross-sectional  differences
maintain or  increase  its  loan activity during  in EE allocations, but it may have explanatory
periods of increased  financial stress and risk.  power  over  time.  RATE,t  in  the  emergency
The  market  share variables  are  specified  for  loan  equation was  defined  as  the land  bank
the  beginning  of  each  program  year,  and,  interest  rate  divided  by  the  annual  average
given the hypothesized response of each type  emergency  loan interest rate.  High values  of
of institution  during  the  EE  program  years,  RATEit  indicate  that  normal  lender  interest
a  negative  coefficient  is  expected  for  BSHR  rates  were  high  relative  to  EE  rates  and  a
and  a  positive  coefficient  is  expected  for  positive  relationship  between  RATEit  and
FHSHR.  emergency  loans  is  hypothesized.
The  internal  financing  variables,  net  farm
SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  income  (NINCi,_),  off-farm  income  (OF-
EMERGENCY  LOAN  EQUATION  INCi,t 1)  and the ratio  of off-farm income  to
average farm income  (OFIAVGit_-),  were  hy-
The existence of "tightness of credit", "un-  pothesized  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the
availability  of funds  from  normal  lenders  at  demand  for  new  debt and  a  positive  effect
27on the supply of new debt from normal lend-  explained  in  the  data section  of this paper,
ers. With respect to the emergency loan equa-  EE  loan  allocations  were  converted  from  a
tion,  higher  internal  financing  capability  fiscal  year  to  a  calendar  year  basis  for  the
should be negatively related to the allocation  estimation. National calendar year allocations
of  EE  funds.  Higher  internal  financing  ca-  for  1978  through  1981  were  .7,  2.9,  2.0,
pacity should increase the likelihood of funds  and  .9  billion  dollars,  respectively.  Dummy
being available  either internally or from nor-  variables for 1979 through  1981  (D79, D80,
mal  lenders,  ceteris paribus, and  EE  funds  D81)  were included in the  EE loan equation
should therefore  be less necessary,  given the  and  1978  was  used  as  the  base  year.  Based
purposes  of the  EE  loan program.  on  the pattern  of national  allocations;  posi-
The size  of the total farm credit market in  tive coefficients were expected for all dummy
a state, TOTDETit, should be positively related  variables.
to the allocation of EE funds due to the scale
effect.  With all other conditions being equal,  DATA  AND  ESTIMATION
larger allocations  of EE  funds should be  po-
sitively related to farm  credit  market  size.  The  system  of equations  specified  for the
The  credit  availability  proxy,  CREDit,  is  estimation were:
directly related to the "tightening  of credit"  NFIDET
condition  specified  in the  EE  program  doc-  PCEQEt_,  Cf(Norm ,  RATE,,  NINCDEi,
umentation.  Since  a  higher  value  of  CRED  OFINC,-,_,  OFIAVGt  ,  TOTDETI,
indicates  a  decrease  in credit  availability,  a  CREDIt,  BSHR,  FHSHR,  D79, D80
CREDi,t_l,  BSHR.t,  FHSHRiV  D79,  D80, positive relationship  between  CRED  and the  D81,  El  )
allocation  of EE  funds  is expected.  NFIDET,
Given the hypothesis that commercial banks  PCEQt  CVINC,,  RATE,  NINCt-,
would be more restrictive than other lenders  OFINCPC  1  OFIAVGTE,  NTOTDET 1
in making new loans or restructuring existing  OFINC  ,  OFIAVGiHS  ,  E2T),  and
debt during  the EE  program years,  a positive  (6)  Norm  loa, B= DDET  FH  EE2), 
relationship  between  BSHR and  the  EE  loan  N 
allocation  is expected.  The effect  of a  high  Eli  and  E2it  are  random  error  terms  and all
FmHA  market  share  on  emergency  loans  is  other  variables  are  as previously  defined.
less  clear.  A  high  FmHA  market  share  may  Data for the state  EE loan obligations were
indicate  that  a  larger  proportion  of farmers  from  FmHA  "Status  of  Loan  and  Grant  Ob-
in  a  state  have  experienced  financial  diffi-  ligations"  (USDA, FmHA). This source reports
culties  and that FHSHR  would be positively  loan  obligations  by  state  biannually  during
related to EE loans.  Conversely,  if FmHA was  the federal  fiscal  year,  with  a  6-month  sub-
more  flexible  than  other  lenders  in restruc-  total as of March  31  and  a fiscal year total as
turing  existing  debt,  a  high  FmHA  market  of September  30  for  each  year.  Since  most
share would be negatively related to EE loans,  other variables  in the  model were  on a  cal-
In addition to the supply and demand  var-  endar year  basis, calendar  year  totals for  EE
iables  discussed  above,  the amount  of farm  loans  were  estimated  by  interpolating  the
credit  from  normal  sources,  Norm  loans  in  data  for  September  30  to March  1.  Half of
equations  (2)  and  (3),  should  also  have  af-  the loan obligations in each of these periods
fected the  EE fund allocation.  After account-  was  allocated to each of the  2 years spanned
ing  for  farm  credit  supply  and  demand  by the reporting period.
determinants,  states that experienced  higher  Land  Bank  interest  rates  and market  share
levels  of  "normal  funding"  would  be  ex-  data were  from the  Farm  Credit Administra-
pected to have less need for EE funding. Since  tion  "Characteristics  of Federal Land Bank
Norm  loans  is an endogenous variable,  how-  Loans,"  "Nonreal Estate Farm Debt," and
ever,  and the  EE  allocation  equation  is  not  "Real Estate Farm Debt." Emergency  loan
identified,  the  direct  impact  of Norm  loans  interest rates were obtained from the Farmers
on EE funding is not measurable. The reduced  Home Administration  (Ischer).  Farm income
form of the EE equation was used to measure  statistics  were from  the  "Economic Indica-
the impact of the exogenous variables on the  tors of the Farm Sector" (USDA,  ERS  (c)).
EE  loan allocation.  The  off-farm  income  statistic  was  from  the
The final explanatory variables in the emer-  Bureau  of the  Census  1979 Farm Finance
gency loan  equation  account  for the  effects  Survey.  This  figure  was  available  only  for
of changes  in  the  national  allocation  of  EE  1979, and 1978, 1980, and 1981 values were
funds  on the individual  state allocations.  As  approximated  be  indexing  the  1979  figure
28by personal  income  statistics for the  United  squares  estimation  procedure  (Pindyck  and
States  over  the other years.  Rubinfield,  p.  227).  Heteroscedasticity  as-
The  credit  availability  index  was  con-  sociated  with  the  TOTDET variable  was  de-
structed  from  data  reported  in  "Farm Real  tected in the change in debt model using the
Estate Market Developments"  (USDA,  ERS  Glejser technique  (Maddala, p.  262)  and the
(b)).  This source provides the percentage  of  appropriate  transformation  was made to cor-
reporters  in each  of ten  production  regions  rect  for heteroscedasticity.
that  thought  that  credit  availability  had  in-
creased,  decreased,  or  changed little  during  ESTIMATION  RESULTS
the previous  6 months.  Percentages  are pro-
vided  for  March  and  October  of each  year.  The  results  from  the  reduced  form  emer-
The  construction  of the  proxy  variable  was  gency  loan  equation  and  the  second  stage
as  follows:  INCR3, and  INCRot represent the  change  in  debt  equation  are  presented  in
percentage of reporters reporting an increase  Table 1. The emergency loan allocation model
in credit availability for the 6 months ending  results  indicate  that  three  of the four  varia-
in March and  October  of year  t.  DECR3, and  bles related  to loan risk  and credit capacity
DECRot, represent  the  percentage  reporting  had statistically  significant  effects  on the  al-
a  decrease  for the  periods  ending  in  March  location  of  EE  funds.  States  with higher  ag-
and  October  of year  t.  The  variable  CRED,  gregate  debt-to-equity  ratios  received  more
was  defined  as:  EE  funds,  after  accounting  for other  effects.
States with higher levels of farm income  rel-
(7)  CREDt  =  (+DECR(oi,)  - INCRIO(t-l))  ative  to  debt  and  with  greater  relative  in-
+  (DECR3t  - INCR3t).
This  variable  shows  the  net  (decrease-in- This  variable  shows  the  net  (decrease-in-  TABLE  1.  REGRESSION  RESULTS  FOR  EE ALLOCATION  AND
crease)  percentage  of reporters  in  each  re-  CHANGE  IN  DEBT  EQUATIONS,  1978-1981
gion reporting  a decrease  or increase  in  the  Equ
Equation availability  of credit for the two consecutive  E Dependent variable  EE  DDET
6 month periods ending in March of each  EE  e
program  year.  While  the  proxy  does not  di-  Regres  t  -5526  8295 Intercept  ..........  -55.26  82.95
rectly  measure  the  magnitude  or  scope  of  (.93)a  (1.07)
the  change  in  credit  availability,  it  should  EEHAT  ...............  .97
be closely  related to both  of these measures.  DE.....................  80.70b  -22.90
If  the  tightening  of credit  in  a  region  was  (1.96)  (1.40)
particularly severe or widespread throughout  NFIDET  .....  42.76.  1 4.73
(2.36)  (.35)
a  region,  the  percentage  of  reporters  indi-  PCEQ  ................  -52.03b  3.50
eating a decrease  in credit availability should  (1.82)  (.05)
CVINC  ...............  -.11  -1.47b be  large  and  the  percentage  indicating  an  (52)  (1.3
increase  should  be  small.  RATE  .................  49.82  -2.33
Net  cash  farm  income  was  used  in  the  (.83)  (.30)
NINC  .................  .005  .12'
NFIDET  and NINC  variables.  Non-money  in-  (.77)  (3.46)
come  was  subtracted  from  net  farm  income  OFINC  ...............  .008b  -. 058c
and  depreciation  and  capital  consumption  OF(1.96)  (234)
OFIAVG  .............  - 1.78b  2.13
expenses were added to the result to estimate  (1.80)  (.77)
net cash  farm income.  TOTDET  ............  .003  .106c
The  model described by equations  (4)  and  CRED1.62)  (10.64) CRED  ..  . .11  - .414'
(5)  was  estimated by pooling  the cross-sec-  (.96)  (2.05)
tional data for the 4 years of the EE program.  BSHR  .................  42.67  98.14
Equation  (6)  is  an  identity and  was  not  es-  FHSHR  ...............  2280  3.33
timated. The  change in debt equation  is  un-  (.76)  (1.85)
identified  by  the  order  condition  for  D79  .........  . 4595 (5.48)
identification  (Pindyck  and  Rubinfield,  p.  D80  ...................  19.26
274). The reduced form of the EE loan equa-  (1.26) D  8  - ............-  (.26
tion was  estimated  by regressing  emergency  ..........  . -49
loans  against  all  exogenous  variables  in the  F  21.82  162.6
system. The  estimated value of EE  loans,  EE-  R
2 .65  .93
HAT,  was  used  as  a  regressor  in  the  change  aStudent  t statistics are  in parentheses.
in debt equation as part of the two stage least  bSignificant  at  .10  level.  'Significant  at  .05  level.
29creases in equity in the previous year received  found to be statistically  significant  and neg-
smaller  EE  allocations  after  accounting  for  atively related  to the  change  in debt.  These
other factors.  A general  statement of the  im-  results  indicate  that  less  new  debt  was  ex-
pact  of these  three variables  is  that  greater  tended  in the  presence  of higher  historical
amounts  of EE  funds were provided  in states  business  risk,  higher  levels  of  off-farm  in-
where  the prospects  of receiving  loans from  come, and a recent decreasing trend in credit
normal  lenders were  poorer.  availability.  Net farm income in the previous
Two variables related to alternative  financ-  year, the  size of the farm credit market,  and
ing possibilities were  statistically significant  the  FmHA  market  share  of agricultural  debt
in the  EE allocation equation.  Counter to the  were  all found  to be  statistically  significant
suggested  hypothesis,  the  level  of  off-farm  and positively related to the change in debt.
income  of  farm  families  in  year  t--1  was  These  results  indicate  that  more  new  debt
positively related to  EE loan amounts in year  was extended in the presence of higher farm
t.  The  coefficient  of  the  OFIAVG  variable,  income,  larger  credit  markets,  and a  greater
however,  indicates  that  smaller  amounts  of  importance  of FmHA  as  normal  lender.
EE  funds were extended  in states where  off-
farm income  was normally of greater impor-
tance  relative  to farm  income.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
The positive  and  significant  coefficient  of
the  commercial  bank  market  share  variable  The stated purposes of the EE loan program
indicates  that  more  EE  funds were provided  were to provide credit to farmers facing eco-
to  states  in which  commercial  banks  had  a  nomic stress,  tight credit conditions,  and the
larger share  of the farm  credit  market.  This  unavailability  of funds  from normal  lenders
supports the hypothesis that banks were more  at reasonable  rates  of interest.  These  justifi-
restrictive  than other  normal  lenders during  cations  of  the  EE  program  suggest  that  the
the  study  period  and  then  more  EE  funds  intent  of the  EE  program was  to expand  the
were  consequently needed.  supply  of  credit  available  to  farmers.  The
The only dummy variable  for national loan  ambiguity  of  the  EE  loan  criteria,  lack  of
allocations that was significant was for 1979,  specific  guidelines,  and difficulty  in  enforc-
the  year  of the  largest  EE  loan  allocations.  ing the general  criteria at local levels  raised
The  remaining  independent  variables  in the  the possibility that EE  allocations would  not
allocation  model were insignificant at the  10  be  consistent with congressional  intent and
percent level.  would  displace  funds  from  normal  lenders
The estimation of the change in debt equa-  rather  than  expanding  the  credit  market.  A
tion resulted  in a coefficient  for the  EE  loan  General  Accounting  Office  examination  of
variable of.97. This coefficient is significantly  individual  EE  loans  made  during  the  early
different  from  zero  at the  99  percent  confi-  years  of the  EE  program  provided  some  evi-
dence  level  and is not significantly  different  dence  that this  had occurred.
than  one  at the  same  confidence  level.  The  This  analysis  examined  the  allocation  of
point estimate of the coefficient indicates that  emergency loans and the expansionary effect
each dollar of EE funds resulted in an increase  of the  EE  program  at the  state  level.  While
in the total change  in debt equal to 97 cents  this level of aggregation  does not allow con-
and hence that the program was almost totally  clusions to be made regarding the individual
expansionary.  The 99 percent confidence in-  loans, it does provide information on whether
terval for the  EE coefficient  is .09 < P < 1.84  EE  funds  were  made  available  in  areas  that
and the 90 percent confidence  interval  is .41  appeared  to be  in the greatest  need,  in the
<  p  <  1.53.  The  change  in  debt  equation  context of the program, and whether the farm
was  also  estimated with actual  values  of  EE  credit market was expanded by the program.
loans used as a regressor rather than predicted  The  empirical  findings reported  here  pro-
values.  The  point  estimate  (.96)  in  this  vide  evidence  that  factors  indicating  eco-
regression  was  almost  identical  to  that  re-  nomic  stress,  tightness  of  credit,  and  the
ported in Table  1 and a smaller standard error  inability to obtain funds from normal sources
of the  estimate  resulted  in  a  higher  t-ratio  were  significant  determinants  of the  alloca-
(3.26)  for the coefficient.  tion of economic emergency loans. Although
The  coefficients  of variation  of  farm  in-  variations  in  EE  funding  in  different  states
come,  the level  of off-farm  income,  and the  were  not completely explained  and  the de-
credit  availability  proxy  variable  were  all  terminants  of individual  loans  were  not  di-
30rectly addressed,  a general  statement that EE  uted  to  their  current  financial  stress by  de-
funds  were  allocated  in  greater  amounts  to  creasing  their  solvency.  Of  course,  neither
areas  experiencing  the  conditions  cited  in  situation  would  have occurred  had farm  in-
support of the EE program can be made based  come  and  equity increased  in the  post pro-
on the empirical  analysis.  gram years  rather  than  declined.
The results of the estimation of the change  An expansionary emergency credit program
in debt equation  indicated  that the  EE  loan  requires  an  improvement  in  financial  con-
program  was  primarily  expansionary.  This  ditions  to be  a  long-term  success.  If condi-
finding is consistent with the conclusion that  tions  improve,  some  farm  operators  who
more EE funds were provided in states where  would  have  failed  may  have  been  able  to
the restriction of credit from normal lenders  continue  operations  in the long  run. If con-
was  more  likely.  ditions  deteriorate,  the  failure  of operators
The  empirical  findings  regarding  the  ex-  is  only  delayed  and  the  direct  cost  of the
pansionary  and  allocation  characteristics  of  attempt  is the cost of the  loan defaults.
the  program  are  positive  in  the  sense  that  A  non-expansionary  credit  program,  used
they  indicate  that  the  program  was  admin-  to refinance  existing  debt to  reduce  annual
istered  in accordance  with congressional  in-  debt servicing requirements  and to displace
tent,  but  negative  in that they  indicate  that  higher  cost  new credit  from  other  lenders,
the  program  may  have  contributed  to  the  improves  shortrun  liquidity  and  cash  flow
current  financial  stress  faced  by farmers.  In  without  decreasing  solvency.  Cash  flow  im-
the case of loans provided to  farm operators  provements  from  this  type  of program  may
who would  have otherwise failed  during the  not be sufficient to save operators in the worst
loan  period,  the  failure  was  probably  only  financial condition. The emergency credit ex-
delayed  at the  expense  of  EE  loan  defaults  tended  is still  at risk  in the  face  of declines
which  will  ultimately  be borne  by the  tax-  in income  and equity. The  risk  is  less,  how-
payers. To the extent that EE  loans expanded  ever,  because  the  program  would  not  de-
the  credit use  of farm  operators  who  could  crease the  solvency  of borrowers and  credit
have  survived  the  1978-81  period  without  will  not  have  been  extended  to  operators
EE  debt,  the  EE  program  may  have  contrib-  facing  the greatest  stress.
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